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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
,JAMff F TREES 
Pl di 11tiff, Res~,ondent, 
v~ 
WAI.'rER M. LEWIS, 
Uefendant, Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
No. 19333 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Respondent James F. Trees sought specific 
performance on several theories of an agreement to purchase part 
of the old Shunesburg Ranch. Alternatively, Respondent sought 
damages from his purchase of the remaining 1,067 acres of the 
Ranch at Appellant's insistence, as a condition precedent to 
purchasi11g Appellant's portion of the Ranch. Appellant claimed 
thcit tlwre had been little more than an outstanding counteroffer, 
Respondent had orally rejected, thus terminating 
Pespondent's power of acceptance. 
DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
An advisory jury empaneled at Appellant's request 
""d '' • 1uou sly found for Respondent. The Honorable J. Harlan Burns 
spPc1ti~ally adopted the jury's answers, entered additional 
'''"'-'istent findings, and reaffirmed the jury verdict. 
RELIEF sorn;HT ON APPEAL 
Respondent states that 11rr'el Lrnt' s failure to comply 
with Rule 75(p) (2) (2) (d) U.P.C.F ullows th ts Court to summarily 
assume the correctness of both the Jury verdict and trial judgme~t 
below. Respondent also seeks affirmatjun of the Jury verdict or, 
several alternative grounds. Lasll y, Respondent asserts that 
Appellant has waived or abandoned his right to an appeal by 
accepting Respondent's tender subsequent tc trial and voluntari~ 
vacating the subject matter ~Lo~~rty. 
Appellant seeks L2VeLsal of the Judgment, or an order 
requiring that this matter be retried. 
STA'l'EMEN'l' OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's statement of the facts fails to comply witl 
Rule 7':: '-r 1 12) (2) (d) U.R.C P. Selective and self-serving, with nc 
cita~i~G tc the record, it is contrary to the overwhelminc 
evidence in this case, the jury verdict, and the judgment anc 
decree of specific performance. Consequently, Respondent io 
compelled by Rule 15(p) (2) U.R.C.P. to independently state th' 
tacts supporting the same with appropriate citation to the reco~ 
The Respondent James P. Trees obtained a liberal art 
education from Dcof'c,.uw University, and graduate degrees fro· 
Harvard University Tl38, In tr,e fall of 1980, he came to Uta' 
looking for grourtd aes th et ica l ly beautiful and reTrote upon whit 
to conduct a small-scale agricultural operation ar 
self-sufficient farm. Tl30. Being previously acquainted wit 
Utah, Trees was particularly interested in property near Zic 
National Park. Upon viewing the old Shunesburg Ranch with hi 
2 
r·'r 11 1 .<:jle irorn Arizona, Trees fell in love with it. 
111 J ! I M"' mon pioneers first developed the old 
! "' J<,,, r· i1r<·und J8f.U at Brigham Young's request that the 
,,(li,.,'l1 I <'r::-. · • f lhL •1rg1n River be managed for agricultural 
T~ - - '· H _ lnd1~n ruins on the property evidence earlier 
Id. When Trees first 
i~::l 1 ~1 1 urv._·sl 1 L1 1 (J, it!:> \Jwncrship was in two parties: the DeMille 
lalllil)', whc' cc:g111ally own<:cd the entire Ranch, and Walter Lewis. 
Th~ reM1 1~ ~<lrcel, though comprising 1,067 acres, has a dedicated 
su••1rient fur unly 8. 7 acres, and can best be 
do d "rough, rocky parcel of property". T541. 
P.ppellc1r,t 11in1selt ci1aciously characterized it as "nothing but 
First Deposition of Walter Lewis [hereinafter 
~DY..L] at 4.'. The cross-hatched area on Pl shows the remaining 160 
<c«r,-s of th"" cl d Shunesburg Ranch then owned by Appellant. 
1'41-42. Abutted to the east and north by Zion National Park and 
~11rrour,clt-d by federal ground, this property consists of two 
c' '['"'"te pi.~cc,s, une being the entryway into the old Shunesburg 
IC1111 h, ano Llw other comprising the main farm on the far east 
s1d.c Con tu 11\ing 9 0 % uf the arable land and a vast majority of 
i h ''"··1 --r '"~hl, 1\ppelle.nt described it as the "heart" of the 
P:::i 1'cl• l l_ihL at 4 2; T~ J. This property also had a habitable 
'.'< _I_ 1- 1~, cj J l ~·l:1oining guest house. T556. While Appellant's 
('\'<\'.:_-' '-" 1 (-'ls ti, still another "home" as the Shunesburg 
II,,_, lh "mr-tnsion", as such, is little more than an 
ui11·,1 ·' ''"' '"' "r<olic" in the words of his client. T556-57; Second 
3 
Deposition of Walter Lewis lhere1rlatler 
Appellant's Brief Lhereinafter AP] al i. 
2DWJ. I at 1 20, cf. 
In 1980, Appellant resided 1n ct suburll of Chicago, 
Illino.is. President of f.tc.ereo Opt iced Company, he was a man oi 
considerable education, with an advc<uced deyree in accounting, 
training in civil enyineering, 3nd a doctorate in optometry. 
T40-4:!, 109. Having acquired the Utah ranch seven years earlier, 
Appellant had only been able to spencJ some weeks in the summer anc 
a few Christmases there 
During this time, 
sold the property, he would 
hppellant often indicated that if ~ 
want a buyer with lots of money whc 
cl id not know what to do with it. T490, 559-60. When Trees 
requested to visit the property in 1980, Lewis consented. T563. 
And, while Trees continued to be represented by Mr. Hogle, Lewis 
wa; t~~w~ contacted by a local agent, Mr. Milne. While Appellant 
indicates that Trees hi red Milne to acquire an option on the 
property, at trial, Milne's agency for either party remain• 
unproven. See AB at 3: ct. Finding of Fact [hereinafter F] 7. 
After Jisji_iny the property, Milne advised Lewis tha' 
Trees and Hogle were pursuing the property, and the partim 
arranged for a meeting .i.n Chicago. T563-64. At this meetina. 
Lewis arrived prepared with maps, descriptions of the wat~ 
rights, and several slides of the rrinch specifically to increas· 
Trees' interest in the property. TSb4-6~. Trees then asked Le~ 
if he could look at the ranch once more, and Lewis subsequent! 
decided that he would meet Trees at the ranch. T565; 1DWL14. 
4 
/\t- this 
l l 
later meeting, Mr. Hatch, an agent for Mr. 
dpptaisal requested by Lewis showing a total 
,,1u I', :"rti 1d tte old Shunesburg Ranch as being $230,000. 
"' 11 cscu,,~ •ons rP(J"tding a deferred purchase price with 8% 
1 n t C' i c~ t '.,cP 'ntert,1~r1t::'d. T577. While nowhere mentioned in his 
l'ri2f, lo['lc''"l1,,n1,' t_hen also rPvealed that he had less than a 
ne1_·1l1t,,,rly relat'•C•nship w1th the DeMilles, who Appellant claimed 
l•atl tri:·d re steal some ot his water. 2DWL131-32. And, through 
extens1v1 negotiations regarding the purchase of the Lewis ranch, 
r,,.~,,11 lc111t te111ctined adamant that Trees should first be able to 
dcquirc· the DeMlll1c propertv. See Fl, 2: T89-90, 593-94; P23. At 
th1s mecctiwJ, the potential of deeding Lewis' property to BYU and 
hct'•lu•J TrePs then purchase it with an annuity back to Lewis was 
also d1scu 0 sPd. After Lewis met with Mr. Kimber Ricks of BYU, 
LPwis rejectPcl it as economically unattractive. Appellant also 
i ndicrited desires to retain some visitation to the ranch, with 
which Tre0~ was perfectly comfortable. T567-68. Suggestions 
i'" rtaininq to Lewis' retention of the habitable home for sixty 
uAy~ w1tl1 a perennial lease to Trees for ten months each year and 
' fJLlrcl1ase option upon Lewis' demise were also discussed. T570. 
lllt1mAtely, lewis indicated that by reason of his wife's ill 
hc·dltl1, it would be more convenient to him to occasionally stay 
''•1.dt, ~1,·J tlDt hP would build another, more accessible home 
_i ,~I , :it•Jµerty he also owned. T509-10 I 560. Nonetheless, 
I' •St~ted that his desires to retain some rights of 
1 ,, woL>lrl be more comfortably accommodated if the DeMilles 
'"'°'' fifst removed from Shunesburg. T593-94. 
5 
Early on advice from several 
professionals, including an dtturney, in reference to the~ 
negotiations. T568, 5 78-80. P.fte1 Appellant rPjected Trees' 
offer of $230,00C as insuff1cirnLly atttactive, Trees the-
increased his net purchase ~ricL to $2I0,00n and the interest rat 
to 14%. T584-85. Appellant, fe,·ling good about hL 
negotiations with Trees, communicated to Trees that he woul 
accept this offer. TS85-8b. BPcanse both parties now desired t' 
unify the ranch under '1'1ees' ownErsh1p, they decided that Tree, 
would take an "optic,n" on the Lewis property, pending hi 
potential ability to acyuire the DeMille !Jarcel. SRe F2; Tl31 
370. 
'~594. 
Appellant then phnned Trees on the 3rd of December 
During this conver,,ation, Trees suggested that he cou'. 
SL0i...l1_• Apnellant' s horse on the property to facilitate Appellant' 
enJoyment of his visitation rights. T594-95. Mr. Steven E. Snm 
Trees' attorney <md attorney-in-fact, then drafted the real esta• 
option, PS, and Mr Hatch took it to Chicago for Appellant' 
signature. T317 Hatch, as an agent of Milne, also took 
listing agreemcnc: which, as executed by Lewis, indicdted a gro; 
purchase pri_ce ,,f $300,000, with a $30,000 commission to t l' 
divided betweE1' lLJgl P and Milne. T51J; P54; F5. 
Thougr. 1rees wr.;o iamil iar wj t l', the essenti«ls of P 
Snow had re~iewed il with him only orally and it had not been n 
to him. Tl42-43. By oversj<Jht, Snow 11alially failed to inch 
a visitation provision in the original document. T313. Prior t 
6 
)/r_'r •Jt Jfl1J [' however, two handwritten changes were made at 
f-'I JI;:: 1 I ,j I I I T46-47, 586-87, F6. One change regarded tax 
r 1 ",,_ "P'·" 1 rw uccurrence of accelerated payments, and 
'"' 1 rnco. r Tl)' m0teriality regarding it. See FB. The 
,,, tc ( r 11' J':(JE:. cl I at t eu b;[ AJ2l:'ellant as an addendum on page 4 of PS 
l.J' C,1r11t;- 1 IH• ["r,,( -! l puj_nt uf Appellant's case. It states as follows: 
1 t is understood that there exists an agreement 
hr·r«:-t n "f''- i C'nec and ul:;tionor for mutually agreeable visitation 
l19tllt: tu1 uk-'tjonor. 
He1ld1 u-elephr~ned Trees regarding the change, and as this 
''"1s1un rE:fl,~cted a then existing agreement of which Trees was 
fully 0wJr(,, he said it w6s fine. T49, 131, 151-52. Indeed, the 
l ri01- couL t specifically found that both parties understood the 
l'"rn'~ 0f ,c1ppelld11t' s retained visitation prior to Appellant's 
exec11tin9 PS, and beyund that, that the agreement itself otherwise 
,,c,curalel y •lescribed the property and the negotiated terms of 
-,ale ln1·J udinq pr1ce, manner of payment and security therefor. 
Sc:c F 10, ~5; T78. In reference to his addendum, Appellant 
t, ·:tilied tr.at ,_-hen it was made he knew what visitation rights had 
hE<''- ,1 y r<ced to, and that the agreement then existed between the 
pOLtl-=-'S T613-14, 617. Similarly, the trial court found that the 
adclc r"J1>rn 21' idencecl an existing oral understanding shared and 
See F7. 
cc: e-_- -ther negotiated provisions were material to the 
First, PS, "the option" provided for a 
,_" , 1 - ' 1 1 ,'losing period after exercise for the preparation of 
,, '"'"~,,ls of trans fer and retention of security in reference 
7 
to the proposed sale. FlO; P'· at '118. S0condly, Appellant 
conceded that he r1egotiared ·"'- set tortt1 the only manner in whict 
Mr. Trees could exercise 11 the c1 rtior1''. Tl:ll, 85-86. As required. 
Trees could exercise only 
[b]y depositing in thP U S. m,,1 i, postage prepaid 
written notice to optiunor of exercise, addressed tc 
optionor accompanied b' 'Ihirt}'-Four Thousand Dollar' 
($34,000.00) in 10wful money uf U1e United States, cash, 
cashier's check or m0ne1· order. Sa id not ice must bE 
':liven on or before December 31, 1980. See P5 at ~5; 
FlO; T88. 
Lastly, due t0 Trees· ar.ticipated exf""nse in acquiring the DeMill; 
parcel, the parties bepar~telv negotiated a provision whict 
specifically required Appellant to notify Respondent in writing~ 
any perceived failure to pertorm pursuant to the parties 
agreement and allow Respondent an opportunity to cure. ~ 
specifically set forth in paragraph 11 of P5: 
Should optionee fai 1 to comply with any of the terr: 
hereof, optionor shall give optionee written not~ 
giving particulars in which optionee is in default, M 
should optionee fail to cure such default within tE 
(10) days of mailing of said notice, this contract sha'. 
be terminated without further act of either party. ~ 
Fll, T382-83. 
The above provision was uniquely important to Trees, insofar as I 
anticipated spendi_:1g close to $600, 000 in acquiring the DeMiL 
property. N:Jteworthy, in reviewing the parties' negotiations a: 
their total agreement, the trial court found that the partiE 
intended that paragraph 11 cf PS, the December 4th, 1980 dccume~ 
. would he emt'loyed to resolve any disputes betwe· 
them and would alluw Def~ndant an opportunity to spec1 
~ith particularity whatever problems he might have as 
any tender or 'Ia.1 iance in t lie performance of Plaintir 
and on the other hand, would allow Plaintiff, ~ 
receipt of such notice, an opportunity to cure a 
claimed default. See F53. 
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't1 J', 
Twn •Yb after executing PS, Appellant copied to Trees a 
,-" l 1 l c"l t-c1 the Superintendent of Zion National Park. In 
"- L-l'~ 1 1 " t i ncli c;i ted that Respondent had an option and 
uwnersh1p at the end of the year, but that 
"H-'--'' ·1+ ''"'l I cl m~ii nta1n some involvement and part-time residency 
du1 l ltll l i f ot imf" PL'.. Trees testified that this was 
wit~ his understanding of the parties' agreement. 
T306 Jmr"t<i1at,-ly ,1fter the Appellant's execution of P-S, Trees 
nutJ1uL1-_ed the issuance of a check for $1,000 to hold that 
cl•1cmne r,t OlcJen th rc•ugh December for Trees' acceptance. Tl32-33. 
''-PL-Pllant ''"'P1ved this check on December 9th, 1980. T46-47; F9; 
;~9- A cc1ve1 11-tter accompanying the check contained the following 
Enclusecl please find check for $1,000.00 as 
nepnsit from Mr. James F. Trees as per agreement. 
option 
P8. 
On December 17th, 198 0, Appellant sent a letter and 
f-OJIClosure to Mr, Hatch in St. George, the real estate agent who 
ha~ earlier gone to Chicago. In this letter Lewis indicated that, 
though nut cuncerned, he thought "it would be wise to put a 
slal 1-in1·11r in '-'riting as to the 'agreement' mentioned at the close 
c f t ht: document". P14. Lewis testified that the 
'2Jlc1osurE>" marked as PlS, did not change the existing 
,_,nrlers'-'"'J1n9 uf the parties, but simply memorialized the same. 
'i' -'.j 1__,I '-:, (I • 6 l_ (, - .-J '~ Similarly, Trees testified that he was 100% in 
ll'•J th the language set forth in PIS. T268. 
""'"w U' _,e:,,ly, the trial court found that PlS, as drafted by 
'I-'"" w»1ely clarified the details of the then existing oral 
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agreement referred to in P5. And, while PlS on its face requir~ 
the separate physical signature of Trees, Appellant testified that 
it was not material to him, so long as Trees would sign Pl5 during 
the option's closing period. Tl22; 2DWL ;1t 50; PS at '![8. 
Consequently, the trial court also found that 
it was not material to Defendant so long as Plaintiff 
agreed to the terms of the writing [PlS] and would 
execute the same during the closing period for the 
purchase of the property. F22. 
Appellant's only concern at this time was that l! 
Respondent predeceased him aftPr exercise, Appellant would have to 
deal with another party. Tb24. The trial court incorporated Pl5 
verbatim in both the decree and the recorded documents pertaini~ 
to specific performance. See Record, Volume 3 [hereinafter R3] at 
30-31, 38; P59 and 60, Supplemental Record filed June, 1984. 
A series of stipulations now becomes material to the 
subseq~ent recitation of facts. Under Higlee v. McDonald, 
No. 18755, filed April 27th, 1984, they are conclusive and bindi~ 
on the parties, preclude the adoption of conflicting findings, and 
should be of particular interest to this Court: 
(1) [B]oth parties stipulated that the December 
17th enclosure (Pl5) was part and parcel of the 
December 4 document entitled real estate optior 
(PS), insofar as it clarified the addendum thereto, 
and both Plaintiff and Defendant further stipulat~ 
that it accurately and adequately set forth their 
acireernent pertaining to visitation. F20; see alsr 
T 12/8/82-12/9/82; Tl36. ----
(2) [D] efendant granted three written extensions of F' 
and Pl5; thus, these instruments, taken together 
were held open until May 30th, 1981 by Defendan· 
for acceptance by Plaintiff. F25. 
( 3) 
document entitled real estate option as clarif~ 
[R]egardless of whether the December 4th, 19~ 
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_tlL the December 17th, 1980 memorialization was an 
'21.'_tion or a counteroffer, the same was held out by 
the Defendant for the Plaintiff's acceptance 
tJ2_r~~ May 30th, 1981. T346-47, F29. 
·4) l'L1intiff tendered orally and in writing to pay the 
amnun t of money required by the documents, with 
ctgrc"Pd credit for amounts previously received by 
the Defendant for extensions. (T 12/8/82-12/9/82; 
T347. 
('J) Ftum and after the 30th of May, 1981, the Defendant 
did at no time notify Mr. Trees specifying any 
defect or failure in Mr. Trees' tender or 
performance. Tl36, 410-12. 
(6) Defendant further stipulated that concurrently the 
Plctintiff was not in default in any particular in 
his obligations from December 4th, 1980 up through 
and including May 30th, 1981, which proposition the 
court specifically accepted. Fl4. 
( 7) Lastly, at trial the parties stipulated that PS and 
PlS were to be considered together as but one 
document and treated as the same. Fl7. 
Exhibit PlS as mailed to Hatch by Lewis was subsequently 
left by Halch at the St. George offices of attorney Snow. F24. 
llr1ti 1 May 27th, 1981, Lewis never inquired of anyone about PIS, 
,1nd indeed, despite "abundant opportunity", would speak to neither 
!latch nor Trees about the same. F26. Meanwhile, Trees was not 
inff'rm»d ui PlS. by mid-December, 1980, Trees, in good faith, was 
en.ire· s »ed in irnmedia te negotiations with the DeMilles which 
rnitially were not fruitful. F2S. 
As previously stated, whether denominated as an "option" 
, L 1•11tc·rrif:"<·l.·", Appellant's offer to sell remained open through 
1·•u, 10th, 1981 , by red.son of three written extensions for which, 
ii, t•-ut, $1,500 was paid as consideration to be credited toward 
F25. Trees' frequent reports that he 
wct~ h3v1nq difficulty closing with the DeMilles were the basis for 
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each extension. T52-53. With each request for an extension, 
Respondent would personally contact l'.ppeJ l ant, after which would 
follow a call to Appellant by Respondent's attorney, Mr. Snow. 
F25. On other occasions, Trees simply called Appellant to discus1 
problems he was having with the DeMillt·s concerning minera: 
rights, access, or negotiations regardiPG ~zice. To encourage thr 
DeMilles to sell. Appellant told them thut if they would sell hf 
had an option agreement that would doubtless be exercised, anc 
that he would sell also. T632. Unbeknownst to Trees, however, 
Appellant had also been contactect through Dale Docksteader, yet 
another real estate agent, by Robert Redford regarding t~ 
property. In late March, Appellant finally told Trees about 
Redford. T624-25. Meanwhile, pending Respondent's solving hio 
problems with the DeMilles, Appellant covertly felt that Pl5 wao 
conceded-L,' ,Limportant. T352; ~ Answer to Interrogatory No. 55, 
Rl at 352. 
Appellant 
The trial court found that in each extension granted ~ 
the words used by the parties in reference to the natw 
of their agreemer,r were "The Option" and in Defendant' 
[Jl.ppellant' ;,] rr.ind the word "option" referred to th· 
Decerober 4th a Pd 17th documents [PS, PlS], which take· 
together comprised in their entirety Defendant' 
proposal to sell the property. F27. 
During the same period of time, the DeMilles also spoke ~ 
Appellant, whc v.as well aware uf Trees' difficulty with ther 
T589. As Trees became concerned about losing Appellant's proper' 
to Mr. Redford, Appellant became increasingly impatient due 
Trees' failure to reach an agreement with the DeMilles ar 11 
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t--~( 1 is~ ilthe option". T25, 591-92. Ultimately, Snow proposed 
1 ""l 1·"' :, •·xer<·ise the option prior to reaching an agreement wjth 
, '" IJ.,H' I !es, h11t l'.f•fJclldllt was again adamant that Trees not 
the 0pt io11 dbsent this condition. T382, 593. As 
~•lJf·l' l lcin t specif lC:d lly sta tcd in his last extension: 
1, Walter M. Lewis, hereby extend the option of 
t'c.v. 1980 for dnother 30 days. 
As my part is dependent on Jim's first being able 
to acquire the DeMille property, I don't know how else 
w~ could do this--but extensions cannot of course go on 
Ji de tini tely as there is a considerable financial loss 
involved tor me each time. Sincerely, /s/ Walter M. 
Lewis P73. 
It Wds conceded by Lewis at trial that even though P23 
r~1ers to a November, 1980 option, Appellant's intended reference 
1cas to P'i. F28; T54. Clearly, however, Lewis' sale depended on 
Trees first being dble to acquire the DeMille property. T54. 
Aprellant conceded that during the spring of 1981 he had 
at least five conversations with Trees. T619. Trees placed the 
fiyure at closer to ten. T291. Appellant had additional 
conversations with Snow. Several of the problems with the 
DeMil!cs were dmplified upon, and other matters, including mineral 
1 i9hts, ~ potential location for Trees' post office box, and 
mdxlrniLat1011 of access to the Ranch by constructing a bridge were 
discussed T291-92, 321-23; see c.lso F25. Despite these ------
c:•n.cers2tions, however, Appellant never spoke to Hatch or Trees 
.. th''"' Pl~, the• De•cPmhc;r 17th memorandum, until late May of 1981, 
·L 0 p1te ;,hu11dant opportunities to do so! F26. While the evidence 
regarding the substance of conversations between 
Appel l0:1t a11d .ittorney Snow during this period, the trial court, 
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nonetheless, found that no issue of importance ever arose between 
the parties on or before May 27th, 1981. Id. 
On May 26th, 1981, after a substantial expenditure of 
time and attorney's fees, and in conformity with Appellant's 
demand that Trees first be able to acquire the DeMille property, 
Trees successfully completed his negotiations with the DeMilleu. 
See F30; T251-60, 276, 278-79, 327-30. Thus, on that date, 
subject only to Trees' proceeding in good faith to close, his 
transaction with the DeMilles had been successfully culminated, 
and Trees' ability to cluse with the DeMilles was never raised as 
an issue. See F31 and 32. Despite an appraisal indicating that 
the DeMille property alone hiid a value of only $613, 000, Trees 
ultimately paid $846,000 to acquire it. See P58; cf. Tl36-38. 
On May 27th, ~981, Trees excitedly phoned Appellant to 
report thct'~ he had successfully completed his negotiations with 
the DeMilles. T309-10. Appellant now characterizes this 
conversation as Respondent's oral rejection of his "counteroffer", 
a term which Appellant first conceived at the insistence of his 
attorney some two weeks la+cer. T613; 2DWL at 87, 109; AB 5, 7-8. 
The thrust of this conversation, if closely scrutinized, however, 
rejected nothing, and instead evidenced Trees' firm commitment tc 
comply with the parties' bargain. SPe F33. Trees related the 
conversation on pages 279-81 of the transcript as follows: 
I called Wa 1 ter. ! was fee 1 ing quite good, because Wt 
had many discussions over the past previous two or three 
months. He was aware that I was trying to settle thio 
dispute with the DeMilles. In fact he gave me soroe 
suggestions about it. . . I probably said somethinc 
like, "Good morning, Walter." I said I was really hap~ 
and I thought he would be very happy. And I said, •; 
14 
o,ettled the DeMille situation. I am able to close on 
it." And he [Mr. Lewis] went blank; there was a silence 
and he still didn't say anything. And that felt very 
weird to me because we had been having very warm 
conversations over the previous months. So I thought 
maybe he was upset because (Objection by Mr. Bell) 
I next said, "Well, Walter, I know you wanted the 
initial payment split in two tax years to save taxes." 
And I said, "Because of the delays that, you know, no 
longer applies, I' 11 be happy to do that for you the 
next year," if that was what he was upset about. 
'l rees then explained that in late December, the payment schedule 
allowed Appellant to spread the initial income over two tax years, 
and thut Trees was willing to do that if a May exercise was 
otherwise problematic to Lewis. T2Bl-B2. Trees then continued: 
Then there was kind of a silence and 
something like, and he was kinda hot, 
"Where is the write-up of my sixty-day 
something like that. T283. 
then he said 
and he said, 
write-up," or 
At this point in time Trees thought Lewis may have been referring 
to the old lease, as he had never in fact heard of Pl5 at that 
time and did not know what Lewis was talking about. Tl72, 217. 
Trees continued as follows: 
I was a little stunned. I didn't know what he was 
talking about. And 1 said, "Walter, what do you mean?" 
And he said, "Where is the write-up of my sixty 
write-up." He did it again in a very angry tone, which 
I had not heard from him before. And I said, "Walter, 
what do you mean. You have no write-up of sixty-day 
rights?" And he blurted out, "You call Mike Hatch. He 
knows all about it." And I said, "Walter, I will. Calm 
down. Let me find out and I'll call Mike Hatch and get 
right back to you." (T282-B3) 
This May 27th conversation ended on a very interesting 
nc'L'. Trees testified to its conclusion as follows: 
Lewis: "Oh, yeah, 
have given you a hard 
yet." 
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. if you think that the DeMilles 
time, you haven't seen nothing 
Trees: "Walter, I'll call Mike Hatch. Just calm down. 
I• 11 be right back to you. Whatever our agreement i.s 
I'll honor it. I'll get right back to you." T283. 
Standing alone, the above commentary mc1y appear remarkably 
self-serving, but Lewis also confirmed this ending tu the parties' 
conversation. Thus, Ap2ellant, upon cross-examination, 
reluctantly conceded that Trees reaffirnicd nn the 27th ot May that 
he [Trees] would honor his commitments, which Lewis also stated at 
his deposition. T641; 2DWL at 14;'7; see also F34. Furthermore, 
Lewis also conceded that he a11grily tcild Trees that if Trees 
thought the DeMi l les had given :, im trouble, that he hadn • t seen 
anything yet because he [Lewisi "iould be a more stubborn foe. 
T649-50; 2DWL at 125. Importar.tly from and after May 27th, 1981, 
Appellant took a position resisting the sale, and regardless of 
what Trees did or tendered, Appellant would not close. T 4/ 1/8: 
at 29-30; 2DWL llG, 1~5; T:213, 650. 1nc1eecl, after May 27th, Trees 
never understord why Lewis would not close, and Lewis would never 
explain why. Lewis conceded that he initially contactec 
Mr. Bell following this conversation, and that thereafter he 
resisted any further pursuit uf the matter. T601-03, 642. 
Appellant evasively then told Snc~w that he was simply not happ: 
with the transaction. i-'e told Trees that he had simpl1 
lost faith. Often he was simply silent. Regardless, the tria' 
court found that after May 7~h, 1981 there was not 
anything that James Trees could have done to bring abou· 
a satisfactory <'(•r,summcttiun of it, from the proof 
[the trial judge] heard. (T 4/l/83 at 28-29; T213. 
Immediately after conversing with Lewis, Trees, 
Lewis' instruction, phoned Hatch. Ila tch, in turn, then phone 
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Lewis, nnrl TrePs, at Hatch's direction, then contacted Snow, who 
thnuqh l-'1eviously not aware of the contents of PlS, now studied it 
•: ,, l ''tu 11 y. T3S8-59, 417, 600. 
Un Mci'f 28th, 1981, Trees again phoned Snow who advised 
1rec': ll1<1t PlS comported with the parti,-,s' agreement. T238; F36. 
As ,lull Tr«es was then in Sagaponack, New York, on May 29th, 1983 
lt,~ agu1n phoned Snow to obtain instructions on how to exercise 
"1 l:P c•ptiun", having decided to accept both PS and Pl5 as drafted. 
Ub4, 146-47. Snow then dictated to Trees the letter mailed 
pursuant tu paragraph 11 of PS. Tl47, 424-25; P24. A cashier's 
check for $32,500 was also tendered as required for exercise with 
ctedit for the $1,500 previously received by Lewis. Id., P25. 
P24, addressed to Walter Lewis and timely mailed on May 29th, 
1981, states in pertinent part as follows: 
Again, 
Dear Walter: In accordance 
contract, and the extensions 
my option to purchase the 
Sincerely, James F. Trees. 
regardless of the content 
with the terms of our 
hereof, I hereby exercise 
property in Utah. 
of the May 27th, 198] 
convPrsation, both parties stipulated that whether Lewis' offer be 
dJ<HiH'lPrized a;: ~n option or a counteroffer, the same was left 
open for acceptance through May 30th, 1981. Supra at 10-11. And 
\\'hi Je T1ees used the words "the option" in referring to both PS 
and Pl~, as did Appellant, the trial court did not find the letter 
1 tse l t unambiguous. See ~· T 4/14/83 at 5. Clarifying any 
urnL i () u i t y , Trees testified that this letter was meant to 
iporate both PS and Pl5, treating the same as one document, to 
111, i ch the parties stipulated. Tl45, 147-48, 211-12, 214, 222; 
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supra at 10-11; see also T376-78, 428-29, 669, 470. The trial 
court, adopting the jury's findings, also found that regardless of 
the documents' nomenclature, that is, whether denominated together 
as an option or counteroffer, that Respondent, by his letter and 
tendered cashier's check, did accept any and a 11 counteroffers, 
options or proposals in whatever form had been submitted by bo~ 
P5 and Pl5. (See Fl3, 19, 29, 44; T 4/1/83 at 29-30) Trees never 
has withdrawn this tender. See F44, 45. 
FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 
Shortly after P24 and P25 were mailed on May 29th, 1983, 
and prior to withdrawing Appellant's offer, Appellant received 
them. T94-F49. Though the tender was consistent with the terns 
of the parties' agreement, Lewis, nonetheless, advised several 
people, including Trees, that he would no longer close the 
transactioP. T209, 376, 477, 635, 642; P24. Subsequently, Trees 
actively explored what Lewis wanted, with Lewis himself conceding 
that Trees even begged_ him what additional performance was 
required as a condition precedent to closing. See Tl36-37. 
perusal of Lewis' deposition reveals the following: 
Q: (By Mr. Hughes) After May 28th, do you recall Mr. 
Trees at any time saying words to the effect that 
"Walter [Mr. Lewis], please tell me what you want, pu1 
in writing what you want so I can comply"? 
A: (By Mr. Lewis) As time went on, he said tha'. 
several times. (2DWL at 93-94) 
Though Trees tried to close several times saying hi 
would sign any additional document Lewis wanted, Lewis, 
response, never told or wrote Trees how his tender wa· 
insufficient and stubbornly refused to close. Tl07, 127, 209 
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() ~ ~ -- i h . Thus, Trees never knew what else Lewis desired as a 
, ,,r,dition precedent to closing. Tl36-37. The trial court 
c,1in!l011:,, fc,und that though Appellant kept Trees' tender for two 
.,1eel<,c;, neither Appellant nor his agents ever objected to its 
sufticiency or nature. See F49-52. The trial court further found 
that c_ven beyond the obvious statutory proscriptions regarding 
tender, l;f:Jpellanl should have contractually employed paragraph 11 
nf P5 to resolve any problem he might have had with Trees' 
performance. See F3. 
Finally, on June 12th, Appellant overtly took a "new 
position", refusing Trees' performance and shutting the door on 
the transaction. 2DWL at 110, P26. Corr@unicated by Appellant's 
.1ttorney' s letter, this was the first written communication from 
Lewis to Trees after May 29th. P26; T644. In that letter, Mr. 
Bell used the word "counteroffer" in reference to P5 and PlS for 
the first time. T613; 2DWL at 109. Mr. Bell also suggested these 
words to Lewis, even though Lewis had previously referred to both 
documents as "the option". See 2DWL at 87. On June 13th, over 
two weeks after Trees' tender, Appellant returned it, without 
''omment or clarification. See F56; P27. 
ATTEMPTED SETTLEMENT 
A few days later Lewis advised both Milne and Trees that 
n1s 1,.,,yer, Mr. Rell, had found Pl5 unacceptable. 'l'l62, 188-89, 
?119, 391, 393, 483. In settlement discussions with Lewis, several 
lllupusals drafted by Mr. Milne were submitted. T209, 482. Though 
11ot exactly what Trees had agreed to as set forth in P15, Trees 
authorized Snow to execute these proposals, as Lewis had indicated 
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to Milne and Trees that they might be acceptable to him. 1'206-09, 
162, 188-89, 391, 393, 402; P28, 29. 
rejected these proposals qeneratPd by 
Lewis truly felt that he hi'd fulfil led 
Ultimately, Lewis alsc 
Milne. During 
his promise of 
closing, 
May 27tt 
that he would give Trees more problems that the DeMilles and be, 
truly harsh opponent. T650-51; 2DWL at 125. 
TPIAL 
At trial the issues were whether PS and PlS comprised an 
option or a counteroffer, and whether Respondent had accepted t~ 
same. See F77. Though Mr Bell ~ppeared 0penly dissatisfied witl 
his client's testimon•1, \he Jury, nonetheless, found 
counteroffer. T647-48; FB, 40. The Jury, however, further 
unanimously helcl that Jim Trees had accepted the same. (F39, 40) 
While the trial judge subjectively felt that PS and Pl' 
constituted an option; regardless, he found thP evidence clear am 
either event Trees had timel:,• accepted ti:E 
further founc' same. See T 4/1/83 at 14; F40. The trial court 
that the parties' minds had met, and that despite Trees' 
substantial tender, Lewis neve1 notified Trees of any default o 
insufficiency in Trees' performance. See F40, 43, 46. 
Regarding ~ttarney's fees, the trial court award& 
Respondent $45,000 after extensive 
issue. See F60, 62; T6::1s-·129; R3 
testimony and briefing on th• 
at 90, 107. The tr i cil cour· 
dismissed prima facic Respondent's alternative cause of action fc 
economic losses suffered in purchasing the DeMillc property. ~ 
Conclusion of Law No. 10. 
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POST-TRIAL CLOSING 
ThP trial court established June 17th, 1983, as a 
, 1.;J11·c, date. R4 at 39-43. A deed and mortgage were subsequently 
,, c, 1.\c'd r"cogni~ing Appellant's agreed right ot visitation. P59, 
'·''; ~-11pp. Record filed 6/84. Trees' original mortgage note was 
·le livered to l'.ppellant. R4 at 36, 43. 
In early June uf 1983, Appellant's counsel notified both 
Resf•nrd<cJ<t and his counsel that Appellant was vacating the 
prl'rnises. See Affidavit of James F. Trees filed 9/27/83, !s 3-5. 
On June 17th, 1983, Respondent began peacefully residing there. 
le. Tn•cs has now tendered two checks for $70,000 in conformity 
with the· mortgage note and judicial decree. Despite his July, 
l98J cf>peal, Lewis subsequently cashed these checks. Id., all §s 
with exhibits; see also 75(h) U.R.C.P. order amending record filed 
6/84. ~u supersecteas bond has been filed. A third $28,000 check 
hes al,oc. been sent to Appellant. 
POINT I 
APPROPRlATE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL THE 
ilf'F TRMATION OF THE ADVISORY JURY'S VERDICT AS CONCURRED 
IN BY THE TRIAL COURT 
A. Under Utah law, the Supreme Court does 
net ieverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
?aainst the Findings of the trial court. 
Respondent sought specific performance of a written 
~01;t r dCt to cunvey real estate • A contract's commitments are 
. lc-t.c-•rm1nc·d from a thorough examination of the circumstances 
IA>'i..ct1n1r1r; to its execution and formation. See Otteson v. Malone, 
- '1 f'. 2o 878 (Utah 1978). While Respondent concedes that specific 
peer lo1·mCJnce of oral contracts may require a greater degree of 
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certainty, regardless, the same burden of proof does not follow 
the trial court decision on appeal as Appellant suggests. See, 
~· Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); cf. Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491 (Utah 1967); AB at 9-10. Thus, the Utah 
Supreme Court unanimously holds that even where the level of proof 
at trial is clear and convincing, the appellate court, 
nonetheless, applies the "clearly preponderates standard". See 
Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984). Under this standard, 
the Supreme Court does not reverse the trial court's judgment, 
unless the evidence in the case clearly preponderates against its 
findings. Id.; see also Jensen v. Brown, 63~ P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 
1981). Indeed, applying the "clearly preponderates standard", the 
Supreme Court reviews the record, looking for ~ "reasonable 
hasis in the evidPnce" to justify the trial court's findings. Su 
Parks Enterprises, lnc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 
(Utah 1982); Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
and Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980). 
Respondent cites the above because Appellant theorizes 
that Respondent failed to meet his burden of proof. Appellant's 
contentions, however, ignGre overwhelming evidence which compel lea 
the opposite cone] usion of both the jury and the district court 
below, as if to invoke a retrial of the matter on appeal. Thus, 
logical standards of review compel affirmation of the tria: 
court's judgment, even in equity cases, unless the eviden0 
clearly preponderates against those findings. Indeed, this Cour 
will ultimately "assume that the trial judge believed thos< 
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1 '•f''"c Ls of the evidence which support his findings and judgment." 
see NJ< lc,un v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). 
') UJIUlld r l l :i 
R. In the instant case the Supreme Court 
assume the correctness of the trial judgment. 
should 
Rule 75(p) (2) (2) (d) U.R.C.P. states that Appellant's 
bri" f slla 11 con ta in "a concise statement of the material facts of 
the case citing the pages of the record supporting such 
statement." (Id.) On appeal, Appellant's version of "the facts" ------
contains no citation whatsoever to the record or transcript. As 
such, it is clearly not responsive to the purpose and intent of 
Rule 75. See Harmston v. Harmston, No. 19297, filed April 10th, 
1984; and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). Indeed, 
Appellant's entire brief contains only four or five selective 
references to the trial transcript. Ultimately, Appellant's 
~ailure to comply with Rule 75(p) (2) (2) (d) U.R.C.P. allows that 
this Court will logically assume the correctness of the trial 
court's Judgment, rather than, like Alice, pursue the hare in 
search of grounds for reversal. As stated by Justice Durham in 
State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983): 
This Court will assume the correctness of the judgment 
below if counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as to making a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where they are 
supported. Id., citing State v. Tucker, supra; see also 
Lepasiotes ~ Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 
( 19 52) • 
0 ~. in asserting his theory of the lawsuit, Appellant 
1 t1ct1acterizes as "the facts" allegations which not only are bereft 
of any proper citation, but are also contrary to the trial court's 
findings. In effect, by failing to specify where the findings 
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lack support in the evidence, and asserting "facts" contrary to 
those found by the trial court, Appellant creates such confusion 
that his appeal, logically, should not be considered at all. See 
~· Utah-Idaho Sugar Company v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 491, 
210 P. 106 (19n) 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED ALL OPTIONS, 
OFFERS OR COUNTEROFFERS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR 
NOMENCLATURE, IS CLEARLY SUSTAINABLE ON APPEAL 
Point I of Appellant's brief states that the trial court 
should have found that Respondent never accepted Appellant's 
counteroffer. AB at I. In finding Respondent accepted the 
counteroffer, the trial court confirmed the jury's unanimom 
answer to a specific interrogatory, and further found that, 
regardless of the nomenclature applied to P5 and Pl5, "offer", 
"option", or "cc,.:s.teroffer", that Respondent accepted the same 
absent variation and within the prescribed time limits. See Fll, 
19, 27, 40, 42 and 45. 
Summarizing Appellant's argument, he states that Trees 
reJected the counteroffer and failed to physically sign either t~ 
December 5th or the December 17th documents. AB at 7. He ther 
selectively excerpts a portion of the May 27th conversation anc 
construes it as being a~ oral rejection of the outstanding offer 
AB at 7-8. l'.ppellant argues that this "oral reject1on" terminate'. 
Trees' power to accept the offer. Simultaneously, Appella~ 
magnanimously indicates that he would have probably continued wit 
the transaction after May 27th, had Respondent reaffirmed hie 
commitments to the Appellant. AB at 8. Lastly, Appellant argue' 
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t J,,;t Respondent's May 29th letter should have clearly indicated 
i l1al he was accepting a "counteroffer", not exercising an 
Analyzing the above contentions, Respondent first 
tedsserts that both the jury and the trial judge found that he had 
accepted al 1 outstanding offers, counteroffers, options or 
propusctls, without variance, and that he did so by his tender on 
Mct y ~9th , 1981 . See Fl9, 4S; P24, 2S. Regarding signature 
requirements, Appellant's arguments seem oblivious to 
well-established Utah doctrine pertaining to integration of 
instruments. Trees was in Sagaponik, New York at the time of the 
exercise of PS and PlS. The latter two exhibits were in Utah. 
Trees' exercise, by letter and accompanying check, in effect 
legctlly signed both PS and PlS. P24, 2S. Trees' letter, P24, 
,·]early states as follows: 
Dear Walter: In accordance with the terms of our 
contract, and the extensions thereof, I hereby exercise 
my option to purchase the property in Utah. 
Parole evidence clearly established that the words used by 
l\ppellant Lewis in referring to Exhibits PS and PlS were "the 
ciptic'n". See F27. Similarly, Respondent Trees testified that his 
intention in exercising "the option" was to be bound by both PS 
ctnd Pl5. Supra at 17-18. Indeed, both parties stipulated that PS 
a,,d P 15 were to be considered as one document for purposes of 
'' J.a l , and this stipulation becomes no less binding upon the 
1 I 1 lant because it is to his disadvantage on appeal. See, ~· 
ll13lee v. McDonald, No. 187SS, filed April 27th, 1984. Indeed, 
2S 
these two documents are the only ones upon which the Appellant, as 
signator, could be charged. 
The trial court did not find P24 unambiguous. T 4/14/8J 
at 5. With some inherent ambiguity, th<c trial court properly 
considered evidence extrinsic to P24 to delineate Respondent's 
intent and the enforceability of his contractual obligations. See 
Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982); Reed v. Alvey, 610 
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); see also Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1980). Indeed, the principle of the Hackford and Alvey 
decisions, supra, has been a long-standing one in Utah law, 
particularly in Plaintiffs' suits for specific performance. See, 
~· Keir v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); and 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261 at 266, 501 P.2c 
266 at 270 (1972) 
Clear} _ _; Utah precedent .:illows that a separate writing 
may satisfy the signature requirements of the Statute of Frauds, 
so long as some nexus between the writings is shown. Further, 
[ t] his requirement may t'e satisfied either by express 
reference in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or 
by implied reference gle0ined from the contents of the 
writings and the circumstances surrounding t~ 
transaction. In the latter instance, parole evidence m~ 
be used to connect an unsigned document to one that has 
been signed by che person to be charged. See Gregerson 
v. Jensen, 61' P_2c 369 (Utah 1980); see also Petersor 
v. Hendrick, 524 P.2d 321 (Utah 1974); and Miller v. 
Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P. 949 (1926). 
Trees' testimony that he intended to accept both PS and Pl5 war 
overwhelming. The jury so found. The terms used by Trees wer-· 
exactly those terms which Appellant himself chose to use. ~ 
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PJI As a matter of law, Trees signed both PS and Pl5. 
('1~:~e:_E__-=_n_12, supra. 
i.ppP l lant' s argument that Trees on May 27th orally 
tern1,n .• \1-'d any option or offer extended to purchase the property 
lurtt11'r ignores the stipulation that PS and Pl5 were left open for 
FespondPnt's acceptance until May 30th, 1981. See AB at 8; cf. 
~~E!-9 at 10-11. Indeed, it is this stipulation which binds 
11ppellant. Appellant's position that Trees orally rejected the 
outstanding offer is further repudiated by both parties' testimony 
that Trees concluded the conversation reaffirming his intent to 
hcnur all of his commitments to Appellant. Supra at 15-16. It is 
furthPr to be noted that Trees' completed negotiations on the 
ueMille property alone were sufficient consideration to hold the 
documents open for acceptance until May 30th, 1981. In such a 
cr:ntext, Lewis' argument that a disputed oral conversation 
ef feet i vely terminated Trees' ability to accept the offer three 
days prior to its termination must fail. Indeed, in light of his 
stipulation, Appellant can hardly ask this Court to find that his 
offer terminated on May 27th. 
Prior Utah cases hold that a noncompliant acceptance of 
an outstanding offer does not, in itself, terminate the offer if 
otl1er consideration binds the offerer to contractually hold the 
otfer open. See J. R. Stone Company, Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 1285 
't ·'-288 (Utah 1978). Indeed, in attempting to retract his 
cc1µuJ0ti1.n that PS and Pl5 remained open for acceptance until May 
;Oth. Appellant construes a rejection of the same, not from the 
statements made by Trees, but rather from Trees' uncommunicated 
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thoughts. AB at 8. Appellant's counsel then states that up 
through June 12th of 1981, Lewis was probably disposed to 
reaffirming the offer. Id. This, however, controverts the trial 
court finding that after May 27th, Lewis had no intent to close, 
despite any effort made by Trees. Supra at 16-17. Indeed, both 
parties conceded that during the period for closing Trees begged 
Lewis what else Lewis desired in order to close, and that Lewis' 
response was stony silence. 
Appellant testified that 
Supra at 18-19. Characteristically, 
this behavior fulfilled an earlier 
promise that Appellant would give Trees a hard time and be a 
stubborn foe. Supra at 15-16; 2DWL at 125. 
Point I 
Ultimately, 
claims that 
despite parole 
Respondent was 
clarification, Appellant's 
required to state he was 
accepting a "counteroffer" or the 
AB at 10. Tt~ough May 29th, 
"contract" as 
1981, however, 
amended by Lewis. 
the terminology 
universally employed by Appellant in referring to PS and Pl5 was 
"the option". See F27. Indeed, Appellant testified that the wo~ 
"counteroffer" was not one either Mr. Trees or himself h~ 
~mployed, but rather one first suggested to him by his counsel two 
weeks later on June 12th, 198j. f2DWL at 87, 109) 
Lastly, Appellant incongruously argues that ~' 
silence constituted an oral rejection of P5 and Pl5. Trees tri~ 
to close several times, however, and specifically pled with Lewi; 
what else was necessary to close the parties' contract. Supra a· 
18. During this time, Appellant, not Respondent, remained rigidl· 
silent. Indeed, the only information Trees got was that Lewis' 
attorney, Mr. Bell, was unhappy wjth Pl5. Supra at 19-20. 
28 
POINT III 
TllIS COURT SHOULD REJECT APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS THAT 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN THE PARTIES; 
THESE CONTENTIONS ARE BOTTOMED ON PROPOSALS DRAFTED BY A 
NCJl~-PARTY DURING SETTLEMENT AND ORALLY ENCOURAGED AND 
ACCEPTED BY THE APPELLANT HIMSELF; THESE PROPOSALS DID 
NOT CONSTITUTE THE INTENT OR UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
RESPONDENT ON MAY 29TH, 1981 
Appellant's second point on appeal argues that P28 and 
P29, when compared to PlS, evidence a failure of the parties' 
minds to meet. Appellant's argument is sterile, however, and 
contrary to the following facts. First, in early June of 1981, 
during the period for closing PS and PlS, Lewis told both Milne 
and Trees that his attorney, Mr. Bell, did not find PlS 
acceptable. Tl88, 191, 233. As a result, Lewis and Milne got 
together and drafted P28 and P29, with Lewis ultimately 
instructing Milne to have the documents signed by Respondent and 
then forwarded to Lewis' attorney. T192, 209. Trees did this 
thinking that Lewis desired it of him. T192-93, 208-11. 
Secondly, Trees testified P28 and P29 did not set forth his 
understirnding of the parties' visitation agreement on May 29th, 
l 081. Thus, although the agreements were within the context of 
the parties' understanding, Trees clarified that this 
understanding was more accurately set forth by PlS. Tl88, 206, 
/ll. Clearly, on the date of exercise Trees' understanding and 
intent was to accept both PS and PlS. Tl88, 206-07. Thirdly, the 
'r1~l court, on the basis of uncontroverted testimony, similarly 
"'" nd that P 2 8 and P 2 9 were not binding on Trees, but formed a 
portion of settlement negotiations, and were inadmissible pursuant 
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to Rules 52 and 45 of the then applicable Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Tl95-96, 226, 402-07, 409-11. 
In light of the above, Appellant's assertions that P28 
and P29, drafted by Milne with Lewis' concurrence weeks after 
Trees' exercise, somehow reflected Trees' intent on May 29th, 1981 
are incredible. It is incongruous that Lewis should now compare 
these documents to Pl 5, the document accepted by Trees, and 
suggest this belated comparison reflects Trees' state of mind on 
May 29th, 1981. Trees' testimonv as tc> his acceptance of Pl5 as 
clearly defining the visitation agreement never varied throughout 
trial. Indeed, as found by the trial court, Respondent has never 
withdrawn his tendered acceptance of both PS and Pl5 without 
alteration and modification. See F44. Ultimately, by reason of 
the parties' stipulation that Pl5 set forth their visitation 
agreement, ;i.5 h·-lst:ered by the testimony of both, the trial court 
held that Pl5 accurately set forth Lewis' agreed visitati~ 
rights. And, as both PS and Pl5 were extended to May 30th, 1981, 
these documents comprise the substance of the only offer, option, 
or counteroffer then .~hargeable to Lewis as seller, regarding 
which Trees had an opportunity to accept or exercise on May 29th, 
1981. See POINT II, ~upr~. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO OMITTED JURY INSTRUCTIOl'JS ARE 
INAPPOSITE; SUCH JUPY INSTRUCTIONS EITHER MISSTATE THE 
LAW OR ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE OR WERE 
SUFFICIENTLY COVERED BY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS 
In Point III of Appellant's brief, he indicates that t~ 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that an of fer ID 
30 
rountecof fer is terminated by a communicated rejection, and cannot 
L"" subJect to a later acceptance. Appellant's theorizes that 
'J'1,,os orally rejected Lewis' proposal on May 27th, 1981, and thus 
t~rminated the same. 
l\s previously set 
instructions neither conform 
stipulations, nor Utah case law. 
forth, 
to the 
however, 
facts, 
these jury 
the parties' 
First, Appellant's version of 
the May 27th, 1981 conversation selectively omits testimony from 
both ~arties that Trees ended the conversation pledging to honor 
all commitments made to Lewis, and immediately phoned Hatch at 
Lewis' request. Supra at 15-17. Secondly, Appellant's desired 
instruction, indicating that any outstanding proposals were 
terminated by the May 27th, 1981 conversation, is inimical to a 
joint stipulation. This stipulation provides that regardless of 
the nomenclature of PS and PlS, the same were open for Trees' 
acceptance through May 30th, 1981. Supra at 10-11. Simply 
stated, Appellant's suggestion that these instructions would have 
eliminated any need for the jury to consider the efficaciousness 
ot 'frees' timely May 29th letter of exercise, P24, are directly 
contrary to ar1 accepted stipulation. Id., cf. AB at 13. Thirdly, 
beyond the parties' 
P 15 were held open 
stipulation, Appellant conceded that PS and 
to May 30th, 1981 by consideration. This 
runsisted of both Trees' tender of $1,SOO and his continuing and 
11ltimcitely successful negotiations for the DeMille purchase. As 
cJiscussed in J. R. Stone Company, Inc. v. Keate, 576 P.2d 128S 
!Utah 1978), offers supported by consideration are not terminated 
prior to the agreed time by noncompliant tenders. Appellant 
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attempts to construe a May 27th, 1981 oral conversation as akin to 
a rejection of P5 and Pl5. Appellant's theory and interpretation, 
however, are contrary to the facts, the stipulations of the 
parties, and indeed the applicable Utah case law. Appellant's 
instructions based thereon were properly omitted, and contrary to 
the jury's specific finding that Respondent accepted both P5 and 
Pl5 on May 29th, 1981. See F39, 40. 
In the second portion of Point III of Appellant's brief, 
he objects to the trial court's failure to give a specific legal 
instruction relative to the Stat.ute of Frauds. The actual jury 
instructions drafted by the court after extensive consultatior. 
with both counsel appear in t.he record at R3, 289. Instruction 
No. 22 formulated by the trial court specifically instructed the 
advisory jury, ~ alia, as follows: 
The acceptance of a counteroffer would require t~ 
signature of the party who accepts same, or his duly 
authorized agent, and such party would be bound in all 
respects by the terms of such counteroffer. In this 
case the party to accept the counteroffer, if any you sc 
find, would be James F. Trees. R3 at 321. 
The court also instructed the jurors that an of fer in writing ~ 
perform (tender) is equivalent to actual performance if all othet 
respects of the offer are it> accord with the parties' agreement. 
R3 at 317. 
Secondly, the Statute of Frauds was fully complied with, 
as both P5 and Pl5 were extended by Lewis, the party to bE 
charged, and by P24 Trees also accepted and signed those document' 
by integration. Supra at POINT II. 
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Appellant then contends that Trees did not agree that 
the visitation rights be put in writing. This statement has no 
support in the record. Trees was ready, willing and able to close 
and c0me to Utah to physically sign Pl5 during June, 1981, the 
contractual closing period. Supra at 18-19. Lewis, not Trees, 
cefused to close. As finally closed, the recorded documents 
evidence Appellant's rights of retained visitation. 
Supp. Record, 6/84. 
P59, 60, 
Appellant's objections to the jury instructions further 
fail to comply with Rule 51, U.R.C.P., as discussed in Beehive 
Medical Electronics v. Square D Company, 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983). 
Also, Appellant has failed to set forth wherein all of the 
instructions read in harmony fail to fairly present in a clear and 
understandable way the issues of fact and applicable law in the 
instant case. See, ~· Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 at 175 
(Utah 1983). 
Ultimately, compliance with the Statute of Frauds is a 
legal issue, and though fairly presented to the advisory jury, and 
clEc;rly complied with by Trees, the issue need not have been 
presented to the advisory jury at all. Simply stated, Appellant 
ls not entitled to a jury trial of any issue as a matter of right 
in u case predominantly equitable in nature. See Coleman v. 
Uillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981). The jury was appropriately 
'''str ucted pertaining to Respondent's required written acceptance. 
Hesf'oodent, by an integrated acceptance, complied with the Statute 
of Frauds. There is no reversible error. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED P28 AND P29 PURSUANT TO 
RULES 45 AND 52 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In his Point IV, Appellant argues the admissibility ct 
P28 and P29, alleging that they directly contradict Trees' 
statement that he had always been willing to accept PlS. 
Appellant states that P28 and P29, being signed by Trees, bound 
him, and that he never represented that these did not represent 
his point of view. Respondent refers this Court to Point III, 
supra, insofar as P28 and P29 comprised proposals drafted by Milne 
in consultation with Appellant and submitted to Trees with the 
indication that if Trees signed, this case would be settled. 
Trees testified that while these documents approximated the 
parties' visitation agreement, Pl5 was what Trees understood and 
exercised his acceptance on May 29th, 1981. Supra at 29-31. 
Indeed, P28 and P29 not even in existence at that time! 
The trial court, after extensive hearings, excluderi 
these exhibits by reason of both Rules 45 and 52 of the the1 
applicable Utah Rules of Evidence. T386-411. Clearly, under Ruh 
52 these offers of compromise suggested by Lewis and signed b: 
Trees at Lewis' i:equest should not be used to indicate Trees' 
state of mind three weeks prior thereto. Rule 5 2, URE; see alsc 
Annot., 26 ALR 2d 878; 15 ALR 3d 13. Alternatively, even wen 
such documents admissible for some limited purpose, the tria. 
court further found that their probative value was substantial! 
outweighed by the potential consumption of time and misleading c 
the jury that their introduction may well have caused. T409-ll 
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111 this regard, Appellant has not demonstrated in any way where 
the trial court abused its discretion and that injustice resulted 
tlierefrom. Absent this additional showing, Appellant's arguments 
r,,u:ol likewise be rejected. See State v. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942 
(Utah 1982). 
POINT VI 
ATTORNEY SNOW'S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE; THERE WAS NO 
SURPRISE TO APPELLANT 
In Point V of Appellant's brief he argues that the trial 
court erred in permitting the "surprise waiver" of the 
attorney-client relationship by allowing attorney Snow to testify 
at trial. The argument that the court erred in allowing such 
testimony fails on at least three grounds. 
A. There was no surprise to Appellant. 
Appellant took Snow's deposition on October 28th, 1981. 
As Trees was in New York, Snow, without instruction from Trees, 
wcts instructed by Snow's acting counsel, Hughes, to invoke the 
privilege. When Snow's remaining a witness became evident, Trees 
retained Hughes and clearly stated his position that regardless of 
the nolllenclature of PS and PlS, the same had been accepted. See 
RI at 83, ~s 58(8) and 59; see also Fl9. 
Affidavits of both attorney Thompson and attorney Hughes 
ind1cat~ that Jim Trees first waived his attorney-client privilege 
3c lTL'' detJosition November 20th, 1981. See R3 at 193; R4 at 21; 
Uepo"i t.ion of James Frederick Trees [hereinafter JFT] at 133. 
Add1t1unal ly, every pretrial order submitted by either party in 
'hi~ case lists Steven E. Snow as a witness. At a pretrial 
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conference in December of 1982, Respondent's counsel disclosed 
that Mr. Trees would be waiving his attorney-client privilege. 
Appellant's counsel then indicated that he would like to redepose 
Mr. Snow, and as a result the court specifically left discover1 
open until January 10th, 1983 for that purpose. R4 at 21-22, 
24-26; R3 at 318-22. Appellant's counsel never availed himself of 
this opportunity. Finally on the day previous to Mr. Snow's 
taking the witness stand, both of Respondent's counsel approached 
Appellant's counsel with Mr. Snow to afford Mr. Bell the 
opportunity to interview and discuss with Snow the latter's 
testimony. Id., see also T341. 
Appellant's reliance on Phipps v. Sasser, 445 P.2d 624 
(wash. 1968) is misplaced. Indeed, Phipps holds that the 
timeliness of waiver of privilege cannot be determined by some 
specific point in time applicable to every case. The Phipps Court 
then added that the mere listing of a privileged witness on a 
pretrial order waives the privilege and subjects him to open 
discovery. Judge Burns left discovery open through January lOtl 
of 1983, specifically to allow Mr. Bell to take an additiona. 
deposition of Snow. R3 at 318-22; R4 at 21-22, 24-26. Mr. BeL 
declined. On appeal he now claims he was never given thi' 
opportunity. AB at 20. Not only was attorney Bell given th' 
same, but not having takell it, Respondent's counsel reviewe· 
Snow's testimony privately with Bell prior to Snow's taking th 
witness stand. There was no surprise. 
B. Appellant's counsel opened the door to Snol( 
testimony at trial. 
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The testimony of Trees' and Snow's conversations 
Lt>y<lrcling P24 now objectionable to Appellant were first elicited 
by Appellant's own cross-examination of Trees. AB at 15; but see 
Tl41-42, 211-13, 238, 242-43. Ultimately, Snow took the witness 
st dnu only to confirm Trees' specific earlier testimony elicited 
on Mr. Bell's cross-examination. Furthermore, in the early stages 
of trial Mr. Bell's only objection to Snow's testimony was that it 
was either heresay or that the questioning itself was suggestive. 
See T238, 337. Indeed, Mr. Bell's statement in reference to these 
conversations during trial is telling: 
Mr. Bell: Your Honor, this is a very critical area, and 
there were many discussions that day on May 
28th, and we've had a lot to talk about, and 
I'd like this witness [Mr. Snow] to testify 
to as what he remembers and not have any 
suggestions. T334-35. 
These May 28th conversations directly evidenced Trees' 
intent when exercising the contract in his letter and tender of 
May 29th. P24, 25. Trees drafted P24 relying on these 
conversations held the previous day with Snow. Although initially 
elicited by Bell, it was only after all of the material testimony 
had come in that Bell, finding the testimony damaging, claimed 
that he had been surprised. T339-40. 
As Appellant's counsel was first to broach the subject 
ut conversations held between Trees and his prior counsel at 
t 1 i_al, he is presently precluded from asserting any objections 
!hereto on appeal. Having opened the door to this testimony, it 
1 s incc,nyruous that after it is received the Appellant now objects 
to it. See Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 18254, filed 
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April 12th, 1984, IIC; Legler Construction Inc. v. Roberts Inc., 
550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976). 
C. Appellant waived any objection to Snow's testimony 
by his failure to adhere to Utah's contemporaneous objection rule. 
As set forth in Point VI B, supra, Appel !ant' s first 
objection to Snow's testimony, and indeed Trees' testimony as tc 
Snow's statements to him, came well after such testimony was 
introduced. Having opened the door to such testimony, Appellant's 
counsel initially objected to the same in only two limited 
instances as being either heresay or responsive to suqgestive 
questioning. T238 I 337. His first objection claiming a surprise 
waiver of the privilege was not only untimely but well after the 
subject had been completely broached by both sides, and indeed, 
even after Appellant's counsel had indicated he desired to hear 
Mr. Snow's testimony. See T334-39. As a result of counsel's 
failure to contemporaneously object at trial, this issue must not 
now be considered on appeal. See, Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., No. 18254, filed April 12th, 1984 at Point IIB. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW 
The trial court, after extensive testimony, entered a 
series of findings awarding attorney's fees of $45,000 U 
Respondent. T698-729; F58-63. Appellant does not specificall) 
assail any of these findings, but rather asks this Court to simpl• 
speculate that such fees were unreasonable. Beyond the testimoc 
proffered at trial and the contractual basis for attorney's fees. 
a perusal of the file reveu.ls that the case was extensive. At 
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[past eight lengthy depositions were taken, yet only two were 
noticed by Respondent. Several pretrials were conducted and/or 
c,,ntinued, and the matter, at Appellant's request, was ultimately 
tried before an advisory jury for four days. Post-judgment 
motions primarily filed by Appellant were scheduled throughout the 
spring of 1983, so that the judgment was not executed until May of 
1983, more than three months after trial. R3 at 28. Further 
~rguments additionally setting forth the basis for the fees were 
also submitted to the trial court in extensive memoranda. R3 at 
90-106, 283-300. 
Clearly, the trial court had the discretion to make the 
award; it approximates 55% of that to which Respondent's counsel 
testified. See Appliance and Heating Supply, Inc. vs. Telaroli, 
No. 19450, filed May 14th, 1984. Indeed, the award is 
substantially less than the monies expended by Respondent in this 
matter. Respondent is further entitled to attorney's fees on 
appeal. Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984). 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S SUBMISSION OF INTERROGATORY NO. 5 TO 
THE JURY IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
In Point VII of his brief, Appellant argues that the 
submission of Interrogatory No. 5 to the jury was prejudicial and 
confusing. AB at 21-22. District court judges are rarely able to 
rlt fend their decisions on appeal. In this case, however, a 
1ialogue between Appellant's counsel and the District Court Judge 
is telling: 
The Court: You should keep in mind that the jury is an 
advisory jury and the Court submitted those 
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......... 
Mr. Bell: 
interrogatories to the jury. And the record 
should show that the language of the last 
interrogatory [interrogatory no. SJ was 
changed and tailored specifically at the 
request of counsel for the defendant 
[appellant] as the Court WJS approaching the 
bench to instruct the jury, and that the 
trial court executive made the changes while 
the Court was on the bench, consistent with 
the language desired by Mr. Bell. . All 
right, Mr. Bell, correct me if I am in 
error, when we were in chambers settling at 
least any palpable error in the jury 
instructions, as proposed, and interroga-
tories, in chambers, the Court excused 
counsel and I put my robe on and started 
out, and after I left my chambers, but while 
waining [sic] between chambers and the 
courtroom, you asked, with Mr. Hughes and 
Mr. Thompson, to confer with the Court with 
respect to changing some of the language in 
that fifth interrogatory. The Court 
listened to it, and I didn't agree with it, 
but both counsel indicated they wanted that 
change . Mr. Bell, do I misstate that? 
No. T 4/1/83 at 29-31. 
On appeal Mr. Bell incongruously contends that the 
giving of the jury instruction he urged the court to submit to t~ 
jury now constitutes reversible error! Any error which may be 
perceived by this Court, however, has been previously waived by 
Mr. Bell's own actions. Indeed, as Appellant's counsel suggestec 
that the instruction be given, it can hardly be gainsaid that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the 
instruction to the jury. Absent abuse, the interrogatory shoulc 
not disturb the Jury verdict. See E. A. Strout Western Realtl' 
Agency, Inc. v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 19831 
Furthermore, not only was the instruction given within the broad 
discretion of the trial court, in light of the answers U 
40 
iri\Prrugatories 3 and 4, the submission of instruction no. 5 
,u11,,titutes little more than harmless error. F 39-40. 
POINT IX 
SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
Specific performance as a remedy is not rigidly 
doctrinaire in nature; its burdens and standards of proof should 
be invoked only to protect from injustice, and not as a weapon 
with which to perpetrate an injustice. See Kier v. Condrack, 25 
Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970). Contracts need not provide for 
every collateral matter or possible contingency to be specifically 
performed. See Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v. John New and Associates, 
641 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1982). Dealing with written instruments, this 
Court has held that realty contracts, like others, should be 
con st rued as a whole, and that potential di verse interpretations 
thereof do not render the same unenforceable. See Jones v. 
_l:l]_t:lkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). Ultimately, the granting of 
specific performance must always be tempered by the firm 
propus1tion . 
that the parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in 
good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in 
accordance with its expressed intent. . Quite beyond 
this, one party to a contract cannot by willful act or 
omission make it impossible or difficult for the other 
to perform and then invoke the other's non-performance 
as a defense. Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
l 9 7 9) • 
stated by the Ferris Court, being an equitable remedy, 
[ t] he trial court has considerable discretion in 
determining whether equity and good conscience require 
that [specific performance] be granted. Id. at 
859. 
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The following comprise dlternative grounds sustaining the advisory 
jury and trial court decision. 
A. Statutory Tender. 
The trial court found on substantial evidence that from 
and after May 27th, 1981 there was no performance which Trees 
might have tendered upon which Appellant would have closed on the 
parties' transaction. Supra at 16-17. As such, tender by Trees 
under Utah law as A. condition precedent to specific performance 
would be legally unnecessa~y. See Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 
1152 (Utah 1976); Thomas v. Johnson, 55 Utah 424, 186 P. 437 
(1919). In the instant case, both parties stipulated that, 
regardless of its nomenclature, Trees' opportunity to accept 
Appellant's proposal extended through May 30th, 1981 and that t~ 
manner of acceptance was governed by paragraph 5 of PS. Supra at 
10-11; _see also FlO, 23. On May 29th, 1981, Respondent made such 
a tendet, and the same was received shortly thereafter ~ 
Appellant. P24, 25; supra at 17-18. Appellant held this tender 
for over two weeks without comment, and remained silent even after 
Trees begged him what else was necessary in order to close. Supra 
at 18-19. Respondent never specified where the tender was 
defective. Id.; F49-51, 53. Under Utah law, the person to whom a 
tender is made must, at the time, specify any objections he ma\ 
have to it or they are waived. Respondent waived any objections. 
§78-27-3, UCA, 1953; 74 AmJur2d, "Tender" §10; see also Hansen v. 
Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976) and Hackford v. Snow, 6\-
P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) n. 7. 
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B. Contractual Tender. 
In Timpanogas Highlands, Inc. v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 
{Utcth 1975), the Utah Supreme Court held that usually one who 
refuses a tender should state the basis of his refusal. 
Cuustruing the material terms of the parties' agreement, paragraph 
11 of PS would clearly have required Appellant, acting in good 
taith, to have specified in writing any objection he may have had 
to Trees' tender, and allowed an opportunity for Trees to cure. 
See Fll, 53. This Appellant chose not to do, as he knew full well 
that Trees' clear intention was to complete the transaction, and 
indeed do anything Appellant requested in order to close. Supra 
at 18-19. Indeed, in light of Trees' substantial compliance with 
all the terms of the parties' agreement, employing those phrases 
used by Appellant himself, Lewis' unilateral renegging on their 
contract alone justified the trial court's decision. See Fl9, 27, 
43, 45, 51; see also Nielson v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293 at 1297 
(Utah 1982). 
C. Good Faith. 
The lead Utah case regarding good faith is Ferris v. 
Jennings, supra. In Ferris, a real estate agent, by mere silence, 
attempted to frustrate a contract by failing to set forth, despite 
repeated requests, the amount of a "fair commission" which he was 
to receive from an oral contract to convey real estate. Mr. 
Bell's client here acted no differently than did the agent in 
f~£!-1:_~. Thus, despite Trees' repeated pleadings during the period 
,,t close as to what additional performance would satisfy Lewis, 
Lewis responded with little more than characteristic stony 
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silence, or statements to the effect that he had simply "lost 
faith" in the transaction. Supra at 18-19. The only faith Lewi, 
had lost was good faith. Although unnecessary to the trial 
court's decision, when Appellant's c0unsel specifically requestea 
a finding that his client had not acted in bad faith, the trial 
court denied the same. T 4/14/83 at 11. 
D. Estoppel. 
Appellant in this case committed to Respondent that his 
"option" was open for acceptance i:hrough May 30th of 19 81. Ir, 
exchange for that promise, Lewis i.oquested that Trees first be 
able to close on the DeMille transaction, a piece of property 
which Appellant concedes was little more than a pile of rocks. 
Supra at 3; P23. In reliance thereon, Respondent committed to 
purchasing the DeMille property on May 26th, 1981. F31. It was 
uncontroverted that tr.e final purchase price for the DeMille 
parcel was substantially in excess of its real value. Supra at 
14. Appellant is estopped from denying the contract. See Morgan 
v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976); and J. P. Koch, 
Inc. v. J. C. Penney Compa~ __ Inc:_,__, 534 P. 2d 903 (Utah 1975). 
E. Frustration of 2ontract. 
Respondent incorporates the facts and law in Point IX 
A-D, supra. Clearly, Appellant, otherwise imposed with a du tr. 
should not be entitled by his willful acts or omissions, to make 
it impossible or difficult for Trees to perform and then argu-
that Trees' alleged failure to perform is a defense to specif• 
performance. Lewis simply refused to close, never stating why. 
See Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 at 859 (Utah 1979). 
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F. Part-Performance. 
(1) Before trial--Historically to either remove 
urctl rontracts from the Statute of Frauds or overcome allegations 
cf i nde finiteness, part-performance has generally required both 
,,,-rupa ti on ctnd improvement of rea 1 estate. Nonetheless, a line of 
\llcth cases have held that economic detriment alone, if 
sµecifically tied to the contract, is sufficient to satisfy the 
Juctrine. See, ~· LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 26 
Utah 26 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971); Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust 
Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956); and Van Natta v. 
Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920). In the instant case on 
April 25, 1981, Appellant specifically conditioned Trees' ability 
to accept the "option" on Trees first being "able to acquire the 
DeMille property". P23. In fulfilling Appellant's request, 
Respondent committed $846, 000 to be able to purchase the DeMille 
property, over $230,000 in excess of its value. PSS, Tl36-38. 
Trees' May 26, 1981 commitment to purchase the DeMille parcel 
ctlone constitutes part-performance. 
(2) After trial--As set forth supra at 21, Trees 
lias peacefully occupied the property and made substantial 
improvements thereon for well over a year at the time of the 
tiling of this brief. He has, furthermore, tendered two checks to 
thEo Appellant which Appellant cashed. No supersedeas bond has 
'""n filed. Thus, even under a historic viewpoint of 
,,t-performance, Trees has occupied and made substantial 
improvements on the ground. Coupled with the checks tendered in 
compliance with the court-ordered decree of specific performance, 
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a reversal would now require a peaceful occupant to vacate against 
his will property he purchased and has improved. A reversal woulc 
further, of necessity, require Appellant to return those monies to 
Respondent which he has accepted pursuant to the decree of 
specific performance. Consequently, a reversal would contravene 
the behavior of both parties undertaken, from all appearances, iL 
total conformity with the trial court's decree. 
G. Breach of Contract. 
Appellant has never complied with paragraph 11 of P5. 
See also subsection IX B, supra. 
H. Reformation. 
On the basis of the evidence proffered at trial and 
recited supra at 2-21, were there any problems in the language to 
be contained in the deed and mortgage, the trial court in an 
equity case would be empowered to reform such documents to conform 
to the parties' agreement, where to do otherwise would result in 
an injustice. See Mabey v. Peterson, No. 18338, filed April 24th, 
1984. Clearly, P59 and 60, as executed pursuant to the trial 
court's decree of specific performance, conform exactly to wh~ 
both parties intended in the instant case. Supp. Record 6/84. 
Indeed, pursuant to such exhibits, Respondent has occupied the 
subject property and Appellant has received and cashed checks 
tendered in conformity with the mortgage note, the executeri 
original of which was mailed to Appellant. R4 at 36-37, 42-43. 
46 
POINT X 
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO AN APPEAL 
After trial and pursuant to the decree of specific 
[Jet tc,rmance, Appellant voluntarily vacated the subject matter 
property and Respondent moved to the ranch on or about June 17th, 
!983. See P59, 60; see also supra at 21. The original mortgage 
note has been tendered to Appellant with two checks totalling 
$70,000 in conformity to the decree of specific performance. The 
first check was a cashier's check and the second a personal check; 
neither had any restrictive language on them at the time of 
tPnder. Id. Appellant cashed both checks on September 9th, 1983, 
indicating on the reverse side his intent to obtain interest 
thereon pending the outcome in this appeal. Respondent contends 
that Appellant's acceptance of the checks and retention of these 
monies constitutes a waiver of Appellant's right to appeal the 
decree of specific performance which entitled Appellant to the 
checks in the first place. Respondent earlier unsuccessfully 
moved to dismiss this appeal, but the argument was reserved for 
cilenary appeal. Thereafter, Appellant belatedly sought a Court 
0rder sanctioning his cashing the checks or otherwise allowing him 
to return the monies to Respondent, arguing that he had now become 
a self-appointed trustee. This order was denied. 
By a vast majority of precedent, 
[a] party who accepts benefits under a judgment waives 
his rights to appeal with the actual intent of the party 
pertaining to that right of appeal as a general rule 
being 'immaterial'. See 4 AmJur2d, "Appeal and Error", 
§250; see also 169 ALR at 1056. 
Appellant's effort to return or tender back these monies is of no 
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avail to restore the rights lost. See 4 AmJur2d, "Appeal and 
Error", §251; see also 169 ALR 1057. Thus, in Sierra Nevada Mill 
company v. Keith O'Brien Company, 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916), 
Chief Justice Straup indicated that where the receipt of benefits 
under a contract is indivisible from the validity thereof, the~ 
receipt barred further prosecution of an appeal challenging the 
contract. 
In Ottenheimer v. Mountain States Supply Company, 56 
Utah 190, 188 P. 1117, 1118 (1920), Justice Frick stated the 
applicable rule as follows: 
It is elementary that in case a party to an action 
accepts the benefits of a judgment in his favor or 
acquiesces in a judgment against him, he thereby waives 
his right to have such judgment reviewed on appeal. 
In Ottenheimer the lessee appealed a termination of his lease. 
Subsequent to trial, however, he voluntarily surrendered the 
premises. As the lessee's issues on appeal all sought 
reaffirmation of the lease, by voluntarily abandoning the 
property, the Court concluded that regardless of the lessee's 
subjective intent, his behavior, nonetheless, objectively required 
a waiver of the litigated questions, precluding appellate revin. 
See also Cornia v. Cornia, 15 P.2d 631 (Utah 1932). 
In Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah 2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (Utar 
1973), the Utah Supreme Court considered an appeal, despite tt.• 
Appellant's acceptance of monies. In so holding, however, th 
Jensen court specifically found that the parts of the judgrner' 
appealed from were separate and distinct from the ruling upo' 
which the payments had been conditioned. See 30 Utah 2d at 15i 
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in the instant case, however, Appellant's right to receive monies 
jS directly related to the judgment and decree of specific 
performance. The Jensen case was cited favorably and this 
distinction noted by Chief Justice Hall in Hollingsworth v. 
FarmeLs Insurance Company, 655 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982). 
The fact that not all the payments have been made is of 
no consequence, insofar as they are being timely made as required 
by the decree. Appellant's acceptance of substantial benefits in 
excess of $70,000, and his retention of the note alone are clearly 
sufficient. See 4 CJS, "Appeal and Error", §215 at 644-45. 
Furthermore, were Appellant to argue that he cashed the check so 
that at least someone could obtain interest thereon, or that 
otherwise he might be denied interest on the sale by the appellate 
process, this argument, at least as to Trees' personal check for 
$35,000, is unfounded. Personal checks, otherwise uncashed, do 
not terminate interest to a seller in a judicial setting. See 
Pack v. Hull Development Company Inc., 667 P.2d 39 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, had the personal check remained uncashed, interest would 
still be imposed on Respondent's purchase price in favor of 
Appellant. Id., see also Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 
P. 2 (1910). 
Appellant voluntarily chose to cash these checks. He 
rPtains, either personally or through his attorney, the original 
0101 tyaqe note tendered according to the decree of specific 
performance. He has vacated the property. He has filed no 
supersedeas bond. Yet he seeks an appellate reversal which would 
now require Trees to vacate the property and accept his money back 
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on a draft prepared by Appellant. Clearly, this Court should nu: 
entertain an appeal contrary to the simple thrust of all of Lewis' 
affirmative acts. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT FAILED T·0 
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
In the event this Court reverses the decree of specific 
performance, Respondent contends that the trial court erred u, 
finding that Respondent had failed to present a prima facie case 
for damages in the alternative to specific performance. Clearly, 
Appellant was well aware that in compelling Trees to be able ~ 
purchase the DeMille property, he was in effect compelli~ 
Respondent to negotiate the purchase a pile of rocks at a great~ 
inflated price. Supra at POINT IX F(2) Conversations throughout 
the spring of 19Sl were held between Respondent and Appellant, a~ 
Appellant was well aware that the DeMilles had been both difficult 
to deal with and worthy foes in Trees' negotiations with them, 
Having clearly placed Trees in the position where, by personal, 
legal and moral commitments he was required to close with the 
DeMilles, if this Court reverses the decree of specif le' 
performance, then the Court should also remand the matter so t~t 
the legal issue of Trees' damages may be appropriately determinec 
by the jury. Indeed, insofar as the trial court dismissed tri 
portion of Respondent's case without submission to the jury, th 
standards of appellate review favor reversal, and every inferen· 
should be construed in Trees' favor. Of course, this cross-appe' 
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material only in the event that the decree of specific 
p~•tormance is not affirmed on any of the many available grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury verdict and trial court's judgment should be 
iif i rmPd. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of June, 1984. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the !{.-J/v day of July, 1984, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
RESPONDENT Is BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL to J. Richard Bell, attorney 
ior Apµellant, at 303 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84115, postage prepaid. 
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AFFIDAVIT RE SUBSTITUTED BRIEF 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 
County of Washington) 
MICHAEL D. HUGHES, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am the attorney for the Respondent in 
Trees v. Lewis, No. 19333. 
2. On June 29th, 1984, I mailed the Respondent's 
brief for printing. The brief was pr .i.nted in Provo, 
delivered to the Supreme Court on July 5th, 1984, a~ 
concurrently mailed to opposing counsel. 
3. I received my copy of the brief on or about 
July 9th, 1984, and I was dissatisfied with both the quality 
of the printing and the paper used. 
4, The printer agreed to reprint the brief. 
There ure no textual or other changes whatsoever. 
5. Mr. Butler indicated that, as reprinted, 
could substitute this brief for those filed with the Supre~ 
Court on July 5th, 1984. 
FURTHEF AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 1984. 
SUBSCRIBED AND 
July, 1984. 
My Commission Expires: 
1-f-- 56 
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